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We examine the association between financial integration and capital market transparency of 
emerging-market firms. We use four intra-year price timeliness measures derived from the Beekes 
and Brown (2006, 2007) methods as indicators of the firm’s transparency. The sample comprises 
57,465 firm-year observations on listed companies in 24 emerging economies over the period 1995-
2010. As expected, we find that greater financial integration is associated with greater transparency, 
and that the effect is more pronounced when the news about the firm is bad. Using structural equation 
modelling (SEM), we find evidence of a mechanism through which financial integration enhances the 
information environment: improved corporate governance.   
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There has been a dramatic increase in the degree of financial integration in emerging economies in 
the past few decades.1 A growing body of literature has reported the beneficial effects of financial 
integration in lowering the cost of equity capital (Bekaert and Harvey, 2000), stimulating economic 
growth (Bekaert et al., 2001), expanding financing options (Schmukler and Vesperoni, 2006; Lucey 
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1 In our context, financial integration refers to the free access of foreign households and firms to local capital markets, and of local 
households and firms to foreign capital markets. The emerging equity markets in this study are those defined by the MSCI Global 
Investable Market Indices 2007.  
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and Zhang, 2011), and improving firm performance (Mitton, 2006; Giannetti and Ongena, 2009). 
There is also evidence showing that financial integration can improve the information environment 
faced by firms (Bae et al., 2006). Our study contributes to this literature by examining the association 
between financial integration and four timeliness measures of equity market transparency derived 
from the Beekes and Brown (2006, 2007) approach. These innovative measures add to existing 
indicators of the firm’s information environment (e.g., properties of security analysts’ earnings 
forecasts) by examining the intra-year price discovery process. The method we use can be adapted to 
identify the timeliness of the recognition of different types of value-relevant information (e.g., good 
news versus bad news), thereby providing new insights into the relationship between financial 
integration and transparency to investors.  
 
Our sample comprises 57,465 firm-year observations on 10,124 unique companies domiciled in 24 
developing countries during the period 1995-2010. The dependent variables are four measures of the 
intra-year timeliness of price discovery, which proxy for the equity market transparency of a firm. 
Two of the four are raw price timeliness measures and the remaining two relate to the timeliness of 
good and of bad news. The independent variables of interest include two country-level measures of 
financial integration developed by Chinn and Ito (2006) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). We also 
construct a cross-listing dummy variable to indicate the international exposure of a firm. Results from 
the univariate and multivariate tests generally indicate timelier price discovery when financial 
integration is higher. In addition, we find that greater financial integration is associated with more 
timely price discovery of bad news relative to good. Cross-listed firms have slower timeliness of good 
news, implying they adopt more conservative disclosure practices. Importantly, our work suggests 
that financial integration can help to resolve information and agency problems, and ultimately to 




We explicitly test a potential mechanism, corporate governance, through which financial integration 
improves the information environment of a firm. To do so, we focus on Chinese listed firms and use 
both simple regression analysis and structural equation modelling (SEM). We find evidence that 
financial integration has both direct and indirect effects on the timeliness of bad news, with indirect 
effects arising through the mechanism of corporate governance. Specifically, financial integration is 
associated with better corporate governance such that better-governed firms are associated with more 
timely pricing of bad news.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the most closely related 
literature and formulate our predictions. Section 3 describes the data and variables, and Section 4 
presents the results. Concluding remarks are made in Section 5.   
 
2. Related literature and predictions 
 
2.1. Financial integration and the information environment in emerging markets 
 
Our main prediction is that greater financial integration improves the quality of the information 
environment faced by local firms. Previous studies provide evidence to support the prediction. Li et al. 
(2004) find that greater capital market openness is associated with higher firm-specific variation in 
returns and lower comovement in emerging markets. They indicate their finding could be explained 
by several possibilities such as reduced tunnelling because of greater transparency, less investor 
herding, and the activities of informed arbitrageurs. Bae et al. (2006) focus on country-level market 
liberalization in a sample of emerging markets and find that increased openness to foreign equity 
investors is associated with increases in firm-specific information, analyst coverage, and analyst 
value-added, and decreases in earnings management. Bae et al.’s findings suggest that the transition 
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of an emerging stock market into one that is integrated with the global capital market alters the local 
environment for disclosure, information production, and the analysis and use of information, and 
attracts foreign capital to the home country. 
 
Another strand of literature focuses on the effects of cross listing on foreign exchanges. Baker et al. 
(2002) and Lang et al. (2003) report increases in analyst coverage, forecast accuracy, and news stories 
after firms cross-list. Eun and Sabherwal (2003) examine the relationship between the prices in the 
home and host markets for a sample of Canadian firms that were cross-listed in the U.S., and find that 
their stock prices in the Canadian and U.S. markets are cointegrated and mutually adjusting. Korczak 
and Bohl (2005) and Liu (2007) find that when firms are cross-listed on more established overseas 
exchanges, their home-market pricing efficiency as indicated by stock return autocorrelation is 
enhanced. Su and Chong (2007) document that trading in both Hong Kong and the U.S. contributes to 
the price-discovery process for Chinese stocks cross-listed in the two markets. The results of these 
studies suggest that a better information environments in a home market, whereby more information 
about the fundamentals of cross-listed firms can be revealed, feed back into the home market prices, 
effectively improving the information environment and pricing efficiency of the home market. 
 
In light of the studies described above, which suggest that financial integration is positively 
associated with other aspects of the information environment, we predict that financial integration 
increases the speed of intra-year price discovery; for example, information related to price-sensitive 
earnings announcements tends to be incorporated into share prices in a timelier fashion (Ball and 
Brown, 1968) in countries that are more closely integrated with the world’s financial markets. (In the 
present context, price discovery, as described by Beekes and Brown 2006 and 2007, is the process 
whereby value-relevant, private information is incorporated into a stock’s publicly observable market 




H1: The degree of financial integration is positively associated with the timeliness of price 
discovery in emerging markets.  
 
Besides unconditional price timeliness, we are also interested in asymmetry in the recognition of 
good and bad news. Unconditional price timeliness is the net effect of corporate disclosures, 
combined with the actions of information intermediaries, traders, market agents, and investors. There 
are good reasons why disclosure can be valuable to a firm. For instance, low information asymmetry 
between corporate insiders and outside investors can improve a firm’s ability to issue securities and 
reduce its cost of capital (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Botosan, 1997; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). 
Delayed disclosure can be punished by stock price penalties imposed by investors (Cornell and 
Landsman, 1989; Beekes et al., 2014). Disclosure may also prevent claims resulting from legal action 
against inadequate disclosure to current and potential investors, especially when there is impending 
bad news (Skinner, 1994, 1997). Notwithstanding the benefits of timely disclosure, the imbalance in 
corporate disclosures of good and bad news is a familiar topic in the literature. On one hand, 
managers tend to withhold bad news due to their private incentives (Kothari et al., 2009). For instance, 
the disclosure of bad news will incur costs arising from career-related concerns, lower bonus 
payments and a loss in wealth as a result of the stock price decline. In our setting, agency problems 
are relatively severe because of features of emerging markets such as weak financial and legal 
institutions. As a result, emerging-market firms are more likely to withhold bad news relative to good 
news. We thus test the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: The positive effect of financial integration is more pronounced on the timeliness of bad 




2.2. Corporate governance as a potential mechanism for financial integration 
 
Previous works suggest that the scrutiny of foreign investors, foreign equity analysts, and foreign 
stock market listing standards can help improve the information environment by fostering higher 
quality disclosure and governance standards to emerging-market firms (e.g., Obstfeld, 1998; Stulz, 
1999; Doidge et al., 2004). Stulz (1999) indicates that the different assessments of the value of a 
project made by management and investors act as another cause of expensive external capital. The 
“information asymmetry” problem and “agency cost” problem could be manifest in variation in 
assessments, and effective monitoring of management could mitigate these problems. As Stulz argues, 
financial globalization and integration will improve the monitoring of management through 
mechanisms such as the board of directors, the capital market, the legal system, active shareholders, 
the market for corporate control, and the public disclosure of information by firms. Doidge et al. 
(2004) model the trade-off whereby controlling shareholders either expropriate as much of the firm’s 
resources as possible from minority shareholders or increase resources by committing to limit their 
expropriation activities so that firms can raise lower-cost capital from foreign exchanges. Their model 
predicts that the cost of raising external capital will fall with enhanced corporate governance. 
Aggarwal et al. (2011) provide empirical evidence supporting their prediction in that they find a 
positive relationship between international institutional investments and the strength (‘quality’) of the 
corporate governance of local firms. Another strand of literature has examined the effects of 
corporate governance on disclosure and the information environment of the firm. Aman et al. (2011) 
find that corporate governance in Japan is associated with increased disclosure and a greater analyst 
following, but not with more timely price discovery. Beekes et al. (2012a) find that better corporate 
governance leads to a higher analyst following, lower dispersion in analysts’ forecasts, and greater 
forecast accuracy in Canada. Beekes and Brown (2006) and Beekes et al. (2014) find evidence of 
timelier price discovery for better-governed Australian firms. Hass et al. (2014) show that the positive 
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effect of corporate governance is more pronounced on the timeliness of bad news than on that of good 
news in China. Thus we predict: 
 
H3: Firms in more closely integrated economies have higher quality of governance which 
leads to greater transparency.  
 
3. Data and variables 
 
3.1. Sample selection  
 
Our data set relates to 10,124 public companies domiciled in 24 emerging markets covering the 
period from 1995 to 2010. We obtain firms’ price and financial data from Datastream and 
Worldscope, data on cross-listing from the Bank of New York Mellon, data on country-level financial 
integration from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and Chinn and Ito (2006), data on country-level 
financial and macroeconomic variables from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2013), 
data on the information flow of a country from the KOF Index of Globalization (Dreher, 2006), and 
data on legal institutions from La Porta et al. (1998). To avoid survivorship bias, we include firms 
delisted during the sample period. We exclude firms with missing timeliness estimates and control 
variables (to be discussed later). We also exclude financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) 
due to their unique accounting and financial characteristics. The selection process results in a final 
sample of 57,465 firm-year observations. 
 




The measure of price timeliness is derived from Beekes and Brown’s (2006) approach. The measure 
has its origins in the seminal work of Ball and Brown (1968), which showed that annual income 
reports are not a timely source of earnings-related information because most of the value-relevant 
component of earnings (85%-90%) has already been captured by more timely media. Because the 
Ball and Brown measure focuses on a single point in time, it seems more suitable to assess how 
accurately a firm’s share price (Pt), observed at daily intervals throughout the year, approximates its 
terminal value (P0), which in line with earlier literature we take to be the market’s valuation two 
weeks (14 days) after the annual earnings release date. Specifically, we calculate the timeliness of 
price discovery (T) as 
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where Pt is the market-adjusted share price, which is observed at daily intervals from day -365 until 
day -1, and P0 is the price 14 days after the release date.
2 -0.5/365 is an adjustment made to recognize 
the flow of information, which is reflected in returns during the course of the trading day. Because 
idiosyncratic volatility inflates the measure when it is calculated at the individual firm-year level, 
following Beekes and Brown (2006) we also generate a deflated timeliness metric (TD), which is the 
timeliness metric divided by one plus the absolute rate of return on the share over the 365-day period 
used to calculate the share’s timeliness metric. 
 
The idea behind the timeliness measures is straightforward. The longer it takes a firm’s share price to 
capture information and converge to its “final” price P0 (which reflects all value-relevant information 
discovered during the year), the larger is the value of T (TD). A high value for T (TD) thus indicates 
                                                 
2 Timeliness is measured in calendar time, to facilitate international comparisons since the number of trading days in a year differs 
by country. Prices are forward-filled on days when the market was closed (e.g., on weekends and holidays), or when there was no 
trading in the stock. We set the ending date to be fourteen days after the earnings release date, because the market may need time 
to absorb information (Beaver, 1968). 
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low intra-year timeliness. In contrast, if all the information that affects the final price was 
incorporated on day -365, T (TD) would be at its minimum, and the speed of adjustment at its 
maximum. We can interpret T (TD) as a measure of how much value-relevant information is, on the 
average day, already known from other sources before prices finally ‘settle’ following the release of 
the firm’s annual earnings number. In this sense, the variable is inextricably linked to other value-
relevant disclosures that are more timely than the announcement of earnings for the year. 
 
We use the approach discussed in Beekes and Brown (2007) to calculate two additional measures of 
timeliness: timeliness of good news, and timeliness of bad news. For the timeliness of good news, we 
first construct a time series of good news returns,   
     which includes positive market-adjusted 
daily log returns. If the day’s return is less than zero, we set the good news return on that day to zero. 
We then create a cumulative log return series,   
 , by setting      
     and combining the good 
news return series as   
      
    
  from day -364 to day 0:  
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 ⁄              )    ⁄                                                    (2)                    
 
To suppress noise from bid-ask bounce, we chose the third quartile as the filter. The raw (unadjusted) 
returns are filtered at the third quartile to mitigate undue noise (e.g., from bid-ask bounce).3 An 
equivalent procedure is adopted for bad news. 
 
3.3. Measuring financial integration 
 
We gauge the degree of financial integration using both de jure and de facto measures. De jure 
measures emphasize changes in policy and legal controls on cross-border capital flows. Capital 
                                                 
3 Our results are robust to unfiltered measures. 
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controls take many forms, including controls on inflows versus controls on outflows, quantity 
controls versus price controls, or restrictions on foreign equity holdings. The imposition/relaxation of 
these controls reflects the dynamics of a country’s financial market openness. Despite the increasing 
sophistication of de jure measures, there are several potential drawbacks to relying on this approach. 
First, de jure measures may not accurately reflect the actual degree of openness of the capital market 
because they are partially based on various restrictions associated with foreign exchange transactions 
that may not necessarily impede capital flows (Kose et al., 2006). Second, even though governments 
officially pronounce the openness of their financial markets, it is likely that domestic and foreign 
investors and institutions show little interest in the announcements when they are made. Third, de jure 
measures do not capture the time-varying nature of financial integration. Unlike de jure indicators, de 
facto measures focus on the degree to which a country has made use of international financial markets, 
in practice, over time. Given the numerous candidate measures, we select financial integration 
measures based on their appropriateness in terms of relevance and data coverage. An added 
requirement is that the measure(s) are time-varying such that they reveal the dynamic nature of 
integration and achieve some predictive success in empirical studies.4 
 
We adopt the de jure openness index developed by Chinn and Ito (2006). The index is aimed at 
measuring the extent of openness in capital controls based on information in the IMF’s Annual 
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Chinn and Ito use a 
binary coding system to transform information about the liberty in cross-border financial transactions 
into a quantitative scale. Higher values of the restriction-based index indicate greater openness of a 
country to cross-border capital transactions. We label the index as KAOPEN in our study. 
 
                                                 





We also make use of a de facto measure, which draws upon the updated and extended version of a 
dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Lane and Milesi-Ferretti calculate the gross 
levels of international financial transactions via the accumulation of the corresponding inflows and 
outflows, making relevant valuation adjustments. Their measure (LMF henceforth) is calculated as 
the sum of a country’s foreign equity assets and liabilities and the foreign direct investment assets and 
liabilities as a fraction of GDP. Higher values indicate greater openness and integration of local 
financial markets. 
 
Finally, we include a firm-level integration measure, namely an indicator variable DR, indicating 
whether the firm’s shares are traded on a foreign stock exchange through Depository Receipts. The 
indicator variable is equal to one if a firm has a Depository Receipt on issue in a given year, and zero 
otherwise. Cross-listing could affect a firm’s visibility and disclosure standards and therefore its price 
timeliness. Data on firms cross-listed on the U.S. and other exchanges is obtained from the Bank of 
New York Mellon’s website. The dataset includes the name of the company issuing the DR, the DR’s 
trading symbol, the country in which the DRs are registered, the DR type, the primary exchange, the 
DR listing exchange and the effective date of issue.  
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1. Estimation models 
 
To examine the effects of financial integration on price timeliness, we use the following regression 
models, which include country, year and industry fixed-effects.  
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T, TG and TB stand for timeliness, timeliness of good news and timeliness of bad news. FINITI 
represents the financial integration variables. As suggested by prior literature (e.g., Beekes et al., 
2012b; Holthausen, 2009; Leuz et al., 2003; Morck et al., 2000; Yu, 2011), it is likely that the 
variation in equity market transparency depends on macroeconomic and institutional differences 
between countries. We include five variables to control for the information, economic, and 
institutional environment of a country. These variables (explained in more detail in Table 1) include 
an information flow index (GINFOR), a dummy variable of legal origin (COMMON), the annual 
percentage change in the consumer price index (INFL), the natural logarithm of GDP per capita 
(GDPPC), and the ratio of total value of stock traded over GDP (STKTRD). At firm level, we control 
for firm size (SIZE) because larger firms are likely to disclose more frequently and be more 
transparent (Brennan and Hughes, 1991; Lang and Lundholm, 1993, 1996). SIZE is measured as the 
natural logarithm of market capitalization in U.S. dollars (Worldscope item 07210). We control for 
profitability (PROFIT) by including the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation 
(Worldscope item 18198) to total assets (Worldscope item 02999). Firms that are more highly levered 
may release more information to shareholders (Taylor et al., 2012). Thus firms that are more highly 
levered may be the subject of more efficient price discovery. We control for financial leverage (LEV) 
by including the ratio of total debt (Worldscope item 03255) to total assets. We control for growth 
opportunities (BM) by including the ratio of total shareholder’s equity (Worldscope item 03995) to 
market capitalization (Worldscope item 08001). Firms with greater volatility of performance may 
release additional information on a timely basis, but the timeliness of price discovery can be 
13 
 
detrimentally affected by their fluctuating performance (Beekes and Brown, 2006). Volatility 
(RETVOL) is measured as the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the 360 days prior to the 
end of the year. For the timeliness model shown in Eq. (3) we include a dummy variable, namely 
GNEWS, to denote a good news year. GNEWS is equal to one if the firm outperforms the market over 
the timeliness estimation period, and zero otherwise. The reason for its inclusion is that managers 
tend to reveal good news to investors immediately, while they withhold bad news.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 2 presents the mean values of the timeliness estimates for each of the 24 emerging economies. 
The highest mean T and TD are observed in Korea (0.282 and 0.181), and the lowest are observed in 
Chile (0.155 and 0.114). The highest mean TG is observed in Turkey (0.510), and the lowest is 
observed in Indonesia (0.471). The highest mean TB is observed in Morocco (0.516), and the lowest 
is observed in Indonesia and Russia (0.469). The three highest mean LMF are observed in Chile 
(1.332), Jordan (1.120) and South Africa (0.963), and the three lowest are observed in Pakistan 
(0.161), Turkey (0.234) and Indonesia (0.267). The three highest mean KAOPEN are observed in 
Jordan (2.439), Peru (2.428) and Egypt (2.254), and the lowest in China, India, Morocco and Pakistan 
(-1.169). The statistics show some differences in the degrees of timeliness and financial integration 
between countries.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 




Table 3 provides the Pearson correlation coefficients between price timeliness, financial integration, 
and the control variables. The four measures of timeliness are negatively correlated with international 
investments (LMF). TD and TG are negatively correlated with the restriction-based openness measure 
(KAOPEN). T and TD are negatively correlated with the cross-listing dummy variable (DR). Turning 
to the control variables, all timeliness measures are positively correlated with GDP per capita 
(GDPPC), leverage (LEV) and return volatility (RETVOL), while negatively correlated with firm size 
(SIZE) and profitability (PROFIT). We also find that the two country-level integration variables 
(LMF and KAOPEN) are positively correlated with information flow (GINFOR) and GDP per capita 
(GDPPC), while negatively correlated with the inflation rate (INFL). In other words, countries with a 
greater information flow and lower inflation tend to have more liberal and open financial markets. 
The degree of financial integration is also high in wealthy countries. The correlation analyses provide 
prima facie evidence that greater financial integration is associated with an increase in the speed of 
price discovery, which is consistent with our main prediction. In the next section, we further explore 
the relationship using multivariate regressions.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
4.3. Multivariate analysis 
 
Table 4 presents the results of estimating Eq. (3). The dependent variable in the first three columns, 
labeled (1), (2), and (3), is share price timeliness (T) shown in Eq. (1). The dependent variable in the 
last three columns, labeled (4), (5), and (6), is share price timeliness deflated (TD). We test the effects 
of the financial integration variables. Columns (1) and (4) present the results for the de facto measure, 
LMF, and columns (2) and (5) present the results for the de jure measure, KAOPEN. Both country-
level integration variables are included in columns (3) and (6). For OLS analysis, we report 
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standardized regression coefficients.5 The coefficient on LMF is negative and significant whenever it 
is included, ranging between -0.043 and -0.068. The marginal effect of LMF is larger than that of 
STKTRD (coefficient=0.027) and GINFOR (coefficient=0.049). The cross-listing dummy (DR) is 
negatively related to T (coefficient=-0.111) and TD (coefficient=-0.098) at the 1% level. The 
marginal effect of DR ranks second among all firm-level independent variables. The results support 
H1 which states that, other things being equal, greater financial integration is associated with an 
increase in the speed of price discovery, implying a better information environment for firms.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Regarding the control variables, we find that countries with a higher GDP per capita (GDPPC) see a 
more timely reflection of firms’ performance in their share prices. However, we do not find consistent 
and significant effects in the case of the other economic and institutional variables. At the firm level, 
SIZE is negatively associated with timeliness, confirming other evidence (e.g., Beekes and Brown, 
2006; Beekes et al., 2012a, 2012b; Beekes et al., 2014) that larger firms have faster price discovery. 
PROFIT and BM are negatively related to timeliness. The two risk variables (LEV and RETVOL) have 
positive effects on timeliness. GNEWS is positively related to timeliness in all specifications, 
suggesting slower price discovery when investors receive, on balance, good news over the year.  
Table 5 presents the results of estimating Eq. (4). The dependent variable in the first three columns, 
labeled (1), (2), and (3), is the timeliness of good news (TG) shown in Eq. (2). The dependent 
variable in the last three columns, labeled (4), (5), and (6), is the timeliness of bad news (TB). The 
coefficient on LMF is not significant for the timeliness of good news, indicating no relationship 
                                                 
5 The standardization procedure is as follows. Continuous variables are transformed by subtracting the mean and dividing by the 
standard deviation; and indicator variables are transformed by subtracting the mean. For interacted terms, we subtract the mean of 
the variable created by the interaction of the indicator variable and the standardized continuous variable. The transformations are 
based on the means and standard deviations of the cases used to fit the particular model. 
16 
 
between financial integration and the speed of recognition of good news. The negative and significant 
coefficient on LMF for the timeliness of bad news suggests that the price discovery of bad news is 
faster when cross-border investments reach higher levels. The coefficient on KAOPEN is negative 
and significant for the timeliness of both good and bad news, suggesting the presence of a beneficial 
effect of capital market openness on the speed of recognition of value-relevant news. The coefficient 
on KAOPEN is larger in value for the timeliness of bad news (-0.051 in column (5) and -0.048 in 
column (6)) than for the timeliness of good news (-0.034 in columns (2) and -0.035 in and (3)). In 
addition, cross-listed firms (DR) have slower timeliness of good news (coefficient=0.039 from 
columns (1) to (3)), but faster timeliness of bad news (-0.062 in columns (4) to (6)). Our results 
support H2, which states that financial integration enhances the disclosure and recognition of bad 
news relative to good news. Note that the deterrents against withholding bad news are increased 
litigation risk and a greater stock price impact at the end of the year (Cornell and Landsman, 1989; 
Skinner, 1994, 1997; Baginski et al., 2002). In this regard, financial integration has important 
implications for emerging markets since the legal systems and capital markets are still less developed 
in these countries.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
4.4. A potential mechanism of financial integration  
 
In this section, we examine a mechanism, namely corporate governance, potentially affected by 
financial integration, which in turn affects the information environment of emerging-market firms. To 
this end, we focus on Chinese capital markets and listed firms. China, an emerging market, has been 
undergoing governance reform since the early 2000s, such as the 2002 requirement relating to the 
appointment of independent directors, the introduction of Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors 
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(QFII) also in 2002, and the reforms relating to non-tradable shares in 2005. The Chinese sample 
includes 12,613 observations on 2,134 listed firms covering the period from 2003 to 2011. We 
employ structural equation modelling (SEM), which indicates whether financial integration has both 
direct effects on the quality of the information environment and indirect effects via the mechanism.     
 
4.4.1. Corporate governance of Chinese listed firms 
We use the China Listed Firms Corporate Governance Research Database as the primary source of 
corporate governance data. Other datasets for the analysis include the China Stock Market Financial 
Statements Database, the China Stock Market Trading Database, and the China Stock Market 
Financial Database – Audit Opinion. 
 
We construct a parsimonious firm-level score of corporate governance that captures a limited number 
of core governance attributes. Based on prior literature (e.g., Aggarwal et al., 2011; Bai et al., 2004; 
Brown and Caylor, 2006, 2009; Chen et al., 2006; Chung et al., 2010; Fan and Wong, 2005; Sami et 
al., 2011), we select the following seven attributes: independent outside directors as a percentage of 
the total number of board members (INDIV); total number of directors (including board chairman) on 
the company’s board (BOARDSIZE); whether one person holds both the board chairman and the 
general manager positions (DUAL); whether there are any relationships among the top ten 
shareholders (TOP10 RELATION); shares held by directors, supervisors, and executives as a 
proportion of total number of shares on issue (MANAGEMENT); and whether the auditor is a member 
of one of the joint ventures between a Big Four international audit firm and a domestic audit firm 
(BIG4). We impose a criterion for each attribute and construct a dummy variable that is set equal to 
one if the governance attribute in question meets that criterion in a given year and zero otherwise.6 
                                                 
6 See Table 6 for more details. 
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We then sum the six dummy variables to create a single governance score, denoting the result as CG. 
A higher CG value is interpreted as indicating better corporate governance. 
 
Panel A of Table 6 presents the criteria used for the governance attributes and the proportion of 
qualifying firm-year observations for each one. We observe some variations among the attributes. For 
BOARDSIZE and DUAL, more than 80% of the firm-year observations meet the criteria, while only 
about 1% do in the case of INDIV. An intermediate number of observations meet the criteria for 
TOP10 RELATION, MANAGEMENT, and BIG4. Panel B of Table 6 shows the Pearson correlations 
among the composite CG score and its seven components. Note that CG is significantly correlated 
with each component, but the components are not significantly correlated with each other. This latter 
result indicates that the seven components capture different aspects of the corporate governance 
mechanism. 
  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
4.4.2. Path analysis 
As shown in column (1) of Table 7, CG is positively related to FINITI, which is measured by the 
cross-listing dummy variable. This is in line with our prediction that exposure to international 
investors could contribute to the market transparency of a firm. Columns (2) to (5) of Table 7 present 
the relationship between financial integration and timeliness without including CG, while CG is 
included in columns (6) to (9). The mediating effects of CG can be identified to some extent. The 
coefficient of FINITI in column (5), without CG, is -0.226 and is significant at the 1% level; but it 
drops to -0.216 when CG is included.    
 




The results of structural equation modelling (SEM) are presented in Table 8. The equations in the 
SEM include a regression of one of the outcome variables, T, TD, TG or TB, on the mediating 
variable (CG), and a regression of the mediating variable, CG, on the source variable, FINITI. The 
regression coefficients are estimated using maximum likelihood estimation. As expected, the direct 
effect of FINITI on TG and TB is significant at the 10% and 1% level, respectively. Also, the path 
estimates of FINITI to CG are significant at the 1% level for all models. The indirect effect is the 
product of the direct path coefficients leading to and from the mediating variable. The indirect effect 
is the product of rows I and II. We test the significance of the indirect effects using the Sobel (1982) 
test statistic. As shown in column (4), financial integration (FINITI) improves the timeliness of bad 
news through corporate governance (CG). Specifically, the indirect or product coefficient for TB is -
0.001 and statistically significant at the 5% level.  
 




We examine the effect of international financial integration on the timeliness of price discovery in 
emerging economies. For this purpose, we use a sample of 55,790 firm-year observations from 24 
countries over the period 1995 to 2010. We measure raw price timeliness and the timeliness of 
good/bad news as proposed by Beekes and Brown (2006, 2007). We consider two country-level 
financial integration metrics, one looking at the intensity of capital controls, the other focusing on 
actual portfolio investment flows. We construct a cross-listing dummy variable as the firm-level 





Univariate and multivariate analysis suggests that financial integration is positively associated with 
price timeliness. In addition, we find that financial integration improves the timeliness of bad news 
relative to good news. Taken as a whole, the results are consistent with a firm having an improved 
information environment when financial integration is higher. Finally, we examine a mechanism 
through which financial integration increases timeliness. We find evidence of both direct and indirect 
effects, with indirect effects resulting from better corporate governance. 
 
Our conclusions prompt some questions for future research. One potentially important question is, at 
what stage of the financial integration process is the timeliness of price discovery most affected? This 
question is important because it is well known that financial integration is a gradual and reversible 
process. The panel analysis in this paper can capture the implications of the overall integration 
process, but it does not allow us to address the question of when financial integration begins to take 
effect. Future work could look for effective integration dates and explore how the variables of interest 
responded to the change. Research could also explore other channels through which financial 
integration might affect the information transparency of firms in emerging markets. For example, has 
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          Table 1. Variable definitions 
Variable  Description  Source 
     
Panel A: Timeliness variables    
     
T  Price timeliness, estimated as in Eq. (1).  Datastream & Worldscope 
TD  Price timeliness deflated. This measure is calculated by deflating the raw timeliness measure in Eq. 
(1) by one plus the absolute rate of return on the share over the period used to calculate timeliness. 
 Datastream & Worldscope 
TG  Price timeliness of good news, estimated as in Eq. (2).  Datastream & Worldscope 
TB  Price timeliness of bad news, estimated as in Eq. (2).  Datastream & Worldscope 
     
Panel B: Financial integration variables   
     
LMF  A country-level de facto measure of financial integration, estimated as the sum of a country’s 
foreign equity assets and liabilities and foreign direct investment assets and liabilities as a share of 
GDP. 
 The External Wealth of Nations Mark II Database 
developed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) 
KAOPEN  A country-level de jure measure of openness in capital controls based on information from the 
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). 
 Chinn and Ito (2006) 
DR  A firm-level dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm is cross-listed on a foreign exchange in 
that year and zero otherwise. 
 Bank of New York Mellon 
     
Panel C: Country-level control variables   
     
STKTRD  The ratio of the total value of stocks traded on official stock exchanges in a country to that 
country’s GDP. 
 World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2013) 
GINFOR  Information flow of a country, measured using data such as internet users (per 1,000 people), 
television (per 1,000 people), and trade in newspapers (percentage of GDP). 
 KOF Index of Globalization (Dreher, 2006) 
COMMON  A dummy variable that is equal to one if the country adopts the British common law system and 
zero otherwise. 
 La Porta et al. (1998) 
INFL  The annual percentage change in the consumer price index.  World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2013) 
GDPPC  The natural logarithm of GDP per capita in constant 2005 US dollars.  World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2013) 
     
Panel D: Firm-level control variables   
     
SIZE  The natural logarithm of market capitalization in US dollars (Worldscope item 07210).  Worldscope 
PROFIT  Earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation (Worldscope item 18198) divided by total assets 
(Worldscope item 02999). 
 Worldscope 
LEV  Total debt (Worldscope item 03255) divided by total assets.  Worldscope 
BM  Total shareholder’s equity (Worldscope item 03995) divided by market capitalization (Worldscope 
item 08001). 
 Worldscope 
RETVOL  The standard deviation of daily stock returns over the 360 days prior to the end of the year.  Datastream 
GNEWS  A dummy variable that is equal to one when the company’s share price outperforms the market 
over the year and zero otherwise. 
 Datastream 










T TD TG TB LMF KAOPEN DR STKTRD GINFOR COMMON INFL GDPPC SIZE PROFIT LEV BM RETVOL GNEWS 
                     
Argentina 71 481 0.218 0.151 0.498 0.493 0.403 0.365 0.104 0.043 65.682 0 6.209 8.406 18.537 0.120 0.260 1.417 0.023 0.412 
Brazil 344 1,909 0.238 0.160 0.494 0.490 0.480 0.039 0.104 0.280 58.280 0 6.707 8.503 19.447 0.145 0.290 0.836 0.025 0.494 
Chile 117 117 0.155 0.114 0.485 0.498 1.332 1.648 0.051 0.250 72.600 0 1.410 9.061 19.944 0.125 0.217 0.792 0.014 0.479 
China 1,558 8,731 0.199 0.149 0.499 0.475 0.344 -1.169 0.0001 1.077 52.759 0 2.707 7.647 19.717 0.083 0.281 0.383 0.025 0.524 
Colombia 40 226 0.194 0.136 0.495 0.500 0.305 -0.484 0.044 0.042 60.676 0 7.950 8.139 19.294 0.105 0.139 1.903 0.020 0.513 
Czech 46 160 0.195 0.139 0.475 0.496 0.584 1.589 0.094 0.137 88.076 0 2.921 9.373 19.065 0.132 0.145 1.905 0.018 0.456 
Egypt 78 336 0.234 0.156 0.486 0.471 0.374 2.254 0.122 0.304 57.888 0 10.956 7.247 19.315 0.179 0.185 0.675 0.025 0.458 
Hungary 47 287 0.224 0.152 0.501 0.502 0.929 1.644 0.101 0.210 80.754 0 7.438 9.216 18.251 0.113 0.178 1.205 0.027 0.425 
India 2,057 8,535 0.263 0.173 0.496 0.495 0.317 -1.169 0.058 0.710 40.280 1 8.444 6.741 17.586 0.131 0.304 1.044 0.030 0.426 
Indonesia 319 2,213 0.274 0.178 0.471 0.469 0.267 1.159 0.017 0.152 41.971 0 8.673 7.179 17.593 0.120 0.304 1.116 0.033 0.409 
Israel 341 1,682 0.219 0.150 0.507 0.500 0.930 2.228 0.032 0.516 57.559 1 2.679 9.922 17.789 0.073 0.309 0.827 0.024 0.479 
Jordan 122 427 0.225 0.155 0.482 0.487 1.120 2.439 0.012 0.822 75.445 0 5.814 7.906 17.016 0.063 0.182 0.927 0.019 0.546 
Malaysia 1,001 8,611 0.220 0.150 0.495 0.500 0.877 -0.032 0.006 0.474 69.786 1 2.350 8.612 17.528 0.072 0.242 1.245 0.030 0.364 
Mexico 132 1,174 0.213 0.145 0.495 0.493 0.399 0.973 0.165 0.075 62.231 0 9.416 8.946 19.721 0.126 0.241 1.209 0.021 0.428 
Morocco 50 136 0.167 0.122 0.497 0.516 0.533 -1.169 0.000 0.216 66.820 0 1.729 7.709 19.152 0.168 0.169 0.454 0.016 0.551 
Pakistan 141 710 0.230 0.160 0.505 0.503 0.161 -1.169 0.011 0.501 41.283 1 11.203 6.568 17.949 0.168 0.275 0.878 0.023 0.451 
Peru 95 572 0.241 0.162 0.486 0.486 0.425 2.428 0.040 0.035 51.984 0 2.729 8.021 18.239 0.167 0.214 1.375 0.023 0.514 
Philippines 159 979 0.254 0.169 0.500 0.495 0.276 -0.069 0.053 0.107 44.991 0 4.877 7.113 17.798 0.081 0.208 1.402 0.032 0.459 
Poland 362 1,429 0.249 0.166 0.497 0.497 0.544 0.033 0.020 0.132 88.337 0 3.141 9.105 17.921 0.090 0.167 0.828 0.026 0.445 
Russia 111 235 0.258 0.166 0.481 0.469 0.625 0.101 0.366 0.464 80.370 0 10.565 8.729 20.944 0.159 0.231 1.104 0.030 0.485 
South Africa 503 2,895 0.251 0.164 0.506 0.499 0.963 -1.134 0.093 0.825 48.695 1 6.260 8.539 18.351 0.151 0.162 0.857 0.031 0.458 
South Korea 1,683 9,497 0.282 0.181 0.503 0.497 0.438 -0.067 0.008 1.401 56.697 0 3.280 9.756 17.770 0.061 0.266 1.474 0.032 0.397 
Thailand 495 4,164 0.233 0.156 0.496 0.500 0.539 -0.414 0.021 0.465 59.650 1 2.978 7.881 17.591 0.118 0.297 1.106 0.026 0.456 
Turkey 252 1,959 0.224 0.160 0.510 0.499 0.234 -0.743 0.031 0.407 63.210 0 16.365 8.849 18.320 0.142 0.231 0.800 0.027 0.462 
                     
All countries 10,124 57,465 0.240 0.162 0.497 0.493 0.513 -0.293 0.033 0.717 56.226 0.463 5.089 8.258 18.180 0.101 0.262 1.031 0.028 0.439 
                     
     Note: This table presents the means of variables by country over the period 1995 to 2011. See Table 1 for the definitions of the variables. All time-varying variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles. 
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            Table 3. Simple correlation matrix (N=57,465). 
  [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] 
                   
T [1] 0.920 0.152 0.198 -0.050 0.007 -0.047 0.051 -0.056 -0.003 0.043 0.022 -0.228 -0.230 0.143 0.004 0.462 -0.008 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.113) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.480) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.388) (0.000) (0.067) 
TD [2]  0.166 0.204 -0.068 -0.009 -0.052 0.071 -0.065 -0.021 0.052 0.011 -0.225 -0.207 0.136 0.013 0.446 0.022 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
TG [3]   0.587 -0.058 -0.033 -0.005 -0.049 -0.015 0.001 0.027 0.022 -0.056 -0.035 0.025 0.107 0.059 -0.035 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.213) (0.000) (0.000) (0.830) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TB [4]    -0.009 0.001 -0.002 -0.033 0.011 0.065 0.001 0.028 -0.021 -0.021 0.022 0.025 0.066 -0.033 
     (0.029) (0.893) (0.642) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.767) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LMF [5]     0.286 0.012 0.035 0.513 0.409 -0.319 0.405 -0.105 -0.076 -0.129 0.007 0.003 -0.020 
      (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.111) (0.551) (0.000) 
KAOPEN [6]      0.022 -0.198 0.354 -0.160 -0.106 0.425 -0.084 -0.057 -0.038 0.087 -0.030 -0.012 
       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
DR [7]       -0.068 -0.026 0.019 0.060 -0.031 0.231 0.065 0.013 -0.023 -0.069 0.008 
        (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.049) 
STKTRD [8]        -0.128 -0.213 -0.189 0.282 0.094 -0.096 -0.019 -0.059 0.111 0.035 
         (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GINFOR [9]         -0.107 -0.305 0.600 -0.015 -0.120 -0.115 0.051 -0.058 -0.013 
          (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
COMMON [10]          -0.001 -0.305 -0.242 0.064 0.019 0.038 0.034 -0.039 
           (0.912) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INFL [11]           -0.243 -0.043 0.163 0.027 0.022 0.081 0.004 
            (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.323) 
GDPPC [12]            -0.035 -0.148 -0.082 0.120 0.038 -0.021 
             (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZE [13]             0.308 -0.092 -0.336 -0.411 0.164 
              (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PROFIT [14]              -0.237 -0.040 -0.313 0.187 
               (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEV [15]               -0.120 0.182 -0.069 
                (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BM [16]                0.086 -0.106 
                 (0.000) (0.000) 
RETVOL [17]                 -0.021 
                  (0.000) 
GNEWS [18]                  
                   
Note: This table reports the simple correlations between the timeliness and explanatory variables. See Table 1 for the definition of the variables. All time-varying variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles. The p-







        Table 4. Regression results for price timeliness and financial integration 
Dependent variable Timeliness (T)  Timeliness deflated (TD) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
LMF -0.067***  -0.068***  -0.045***  -0.043*** 
 (-4.17)  (-4.18)  (-2.79)  (-2.71) 
KAOPEN  0.0003 0.003   -0.011 -0.009 
  (0.03) (0.32)   (-1.10) (-0.90) 
DR -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.111***  -0.098*** -0.098*** -0.098*** 
 (-5.34) (-5.35) (-5.34)  (-4.63) (-4.64) (-4.63) 
STKTRD 0.027*** 0.021** 0.027***  0.052*** 0.050*** 0.054*** 
 (3.28) (2.52) (3.17)  (6.22) (5.92) (6.27) 
GINFOR 0.049** 0.055** 0.049**  0.061*** 0.065*** 0.062*** 
 (2.13) (2.36) (2.12)  (2.64) (2.81) (2.65) 
COMMON -0.135 0.063 -0.132  -0.151 -0.032 -0.158 
 (-0.89) (0.44) (-0.87)  (-0.96) (-0.22) (-1.01) 
INFL -0.005 -0.008 -0.005  0.00003 -0.003 -0.001 
 (-0.82) (-1.25) (-0.78)  (0.00) (-0.40) (-0.11) 
GDPPC -0.182*** -0.111* -0.182***  -0.178** -0.134** -0.180** 
 (-2.69) (-1.70) (-2.68)  (-2.55) (-1.99) (-2.57) 
SIZE -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.027***  -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.057*** 
 (-4.49) (-4.38) (-4.48)  (-9.82) (-9.77) (-9.83) 
PROFIT -0.108*** -0.108*** -0.108***  -0.087*** -0.087*** -0.087*** 
 (-17.36) (-17.37) (-17.36)  (-16.14) (-16.16) (-16.15) 
LEV 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.034***  0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 
 (7.13) (7.15) (7.13)  (7.88) (7.88) (7.86) 
BM -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.053***  -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.039*** 
 (-9.01) (-8.93) (-9.01)  (-7.30) (-7.26) (-7.32) 
RETVOL 0.408*** 0.409*** 0.408***  0.379*** 0.379*** 0.378*** 
 (56.82) (56.82) (56.79)  (61.71) (61.69) (61.67) 
GNEWS 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.060***  0.116*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 
 (8.12) (8.04) (8.11)  (14.82) (14.79) (14.83) 
        
N 57,465 57,465 57,465  57,465 57,465 57,465 
Adjusted R-squared 0.25 0.25 0.25  0.23 0.23 0.23 
F-test 149.18 149.27 146.64  189.08 189.28 186.02 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        
Notes: This table reports the regression results for the timeliness measures. See Table 1 for the variable definitions. All time-varying 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The estimation method is pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) with standard errors 
clustered by firm. Standardized regression coefficients are reported with t-statistics in parentheses. The values of the t-statistics are reported 

















        Table 5. Regression results for price timeliness (good news versus bad news) and financial integration 
Dependent variable Timeliness of good news (TG)  Timeliness of bad news(TB) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
LMF 0.013  0.017  -0.079***  -0.073*** 
 (0.77)  (1.00)  (-4.70)  (-4.31) 
KAOPEN  -0.034*** -0.035***   -0.051*** -0.048*** 
  (-3.18) (-3.23)   (-5.01) (-4.66) 
DR 0.039* 0.039* 0.039*  -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.061*** 
 (1.87) (1.89) (1.89)  (-3.05) (-3.04) (-3.02) 
STKTRD -0.105*** -0.099*** -0.100***  0.042*** 0.042*** 0.049*** 
 (-11.93) (-11.09) (-11.17)  (4.94) (4.96) (5.68) 
GINFOR -0.173*** -0.173*** -0.172***  -0.111*** -0.103*** -0.109*** 
 (-7.06) (-7.05) (-7.01)  (-4.52) (-4.22) (-4.44) 
COMMON -0.205 -0.282* -0.231  -2.192*** -2.017*** -2.228*** 
 (-1.28) (-1.84) (-1.44)  (-13.85) (-13.31) (-14.03) 
INFL -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.022***  -0.041*** -0.049*** -0.045*** 
 (-2.94) (-3.25) (-3.35)  (-6.52) (-7.59) (-7.06) 
GDPPC 0.070 0.047 0.065  -0.893*** -0.824*** -0.900*** 
 (0.95) (0.66) (0.88)  (-12.43) (-11.75) (-12.50) 
SIZE -0.008 -0.008 -0.008  0.064*** 0.065*** 0.064*** 
 (-1.36) (-1.43) (-1.41)  (11.27) (11.32) (11.20) 
PROFIT -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016***  -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
 (-3.10) (-3.18) (-3.19)  (-4.73) (-4.88) (-4.86) 
LEV 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.019***  0.011*** 0.011** 0.011** 
 (4.44) (4.38) (4.38)  (2.60) (2.55) (2.52) 
BM 0.108*** 0.107*** 0.107***  0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 (20.47) (20.38) (20.38)  (4.58) (4.56) (4.44) 
RETVOL 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.035***  0.075*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 
 (5.90) (5.82) (5.83)  (12.39) (12.32) (12.29) 
        
N 57,465 57,465 57,465  57,465 57,465 57,465 
Adjusted R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.07  0.07 0.07 0.07 
F-test 84.05 84.22 82.78  95.79 95.58 95.31 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        
Notes: This table reports the regression results for the timeliness measures (good news versus bad news). See Table 1 for the variable 
definitions. All time-varying variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The estimation method is pooled ordinary least squares 
(OLS) with standard errors clustered by firm. Standardized regression coefficients are reported with t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
32 
 
                 Table 6. Summary statistics and correlation of the corporate goverance attributes of Chinese listed firms 
Panel A: Criteria used to construct the CG score       
         The proportion of observations that meet the criterion 
      
1. The board is controlled by more than 50% independent directors (INDIV).     1% 
2. The board size is greater than 6 but fewer than 13 (BOARDSIZE).     88% 
3. The chairman and general manager are not the same person (DUAL).     85% 
4. There are no relationships among the top ten shareholders (TOP10 RELATION).    8% 
5. Management ownership (directors, supervisors, and executives) is greater than 1% but less than 30% (MANAGEMENT). 7% 
6. Foreign investor ownership is greater than zero (FOREIGN)  6% 
7. The firm is audited by one of the joint ventures between a Big Four international audit firm and a domestic audit firm (BIG4). 6% 
          
Panel B: Correlations of corporate governance attributes(N=12,613)      
 [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]   
          
CG                                 [1] 0.155 0.447 0.493 0.352 0.307 0.326 0.364   
INDIV                            [2]  -0.016 -0.007 -0.021 -0.011 -0.011 0.042   
BOARDSIZE                 [3]   -0.0002 -0.028 0.033 -0.016 -0.056   
DUAL                            [4]    -0.007 -0.100 -0.044 0.052   
TOP10 RELATION       [5]     -0.045 -0.012 -0.014   
MANAGEMENT           [6]      -0.009 -0.045   
FOREIGN                     [7]       0.064   
BIG4                             [8]          
          
Notes: This table provides the summary statistics and correlation coefficients of the corporate governance attributes of Chinese listed firms. Panel A presents the summary statistics, and 
panel B presents the Pearson correlation coefficients. The statistics in Panel A come from the sample of the price timeliness model because that sample has the most observations. Figures in 































         Table 7. Regression results for corporate governance, price timeliness and financial integration  
Dependent variable CG T TD TG TB T TD TG TB 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
FINITI 0.591*** 0.018 0.078 -0.110 -0.226*** 0.022 0.081 -0.106 -0.216*** 
 (4.48) (0.28) (1.05) (-1.54) (-3.24) (0.34) (1.09) (-1.48) (-3.07) 
CG      -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.017** 
      (-0.85) (-0.69) (-0.85) (-2.17) 
STATE -0.055*** -0.025** -0.014 0.040*** 0.001 -0.025** -0.015 0.039*** 0.00005 
 (-2.68) (-2.06) (-1.21) (3.87) (0.10) (-2.10) (-1.24) (3.83) (0.00) 
NONTRADE 0.101*** 0.036*** 0.039*** -0.037 -0.037*** 0.037*** 0.040 -0.037*** -0.035*** 
 (5.26) (3.00) (3.32) (-3.21) (-3.19) (3.05) (3.37) (-3.13) (-3.03) 
TOP1 -0.029 -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.023 -0.039*** -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.023** -0.040*** 
 (-1.45) (-3.02) (-3.01) (-2.26) (-3.76) (-3.04) (-3.02) (-2.28) (-4.27) 
SIZE 0.177*** 0.051** -0.017 -0.026 0.241*** 0.053** -0.016 -0.025*** 0.244*** 
 (5.57) (2.41) (-0.85) (-1.41) (12.21) (2.48) (-0.79) (-3.13) (12.35) 
PROFIT -0.004 -0.099*** -0.093*** -0.025*** -0.045*** -0.099*** -0.093*** 0.019** -0.046*** 
 (-0.41) (-7.76) (-7.94) (-3.12) (-4.72) (-7.76) (-7.94) (2.12) (-4.73) 
LEV 0.009 0.104*** 0.095*** 0.019** -0.008 0.104*** 0.095*** 0.019** -0.008 
 (0.57) (10.44) (10.00) (2.11) (-0.91) (10.44) (10.00) (2.12) (-0.89) 
BM 0.072*** -0.117*** -0.104*** 0.075*** -0.088*** -0.117*** -0.103*** 0.075*** -0.087*** 
 (3.81) (-9.98) (-8.94) (7.28) (-8.83) (-9.95) (-8.90) (7.32) (-8.70) 
RETVOL -0.004 0.216*** 0.149*** -0.356*** -0.148*** 0.216*** 0.149*** -0.356*** -0.148*** 
 (-0.16) (9.31) (7.13) (-17.30) (-6.23) (9.31) (7.13) (-17.31) (-6.23) 
TRADE -0.063* -0.044* 0.015 -0.134*** -0.246*** -0.044* 0.015 -0.135*** -0.247*** 
 (-1.94) (-1.78) (0.65) (-6.02) (-10.45) (-1.81) (0.64) (-6.04) (-10.51) 
GNEWS  0.366*** 0.383***   0.365*** 0.383***   
  (22.05) (22.10)   (22.01) (22.07)   
          
N 12,613 12,613 12,613 12,613 12,613 12,613 12,613 12,613 12,613 
Adjusted R-squared 0.06 0.16 0.16 0.26 0.24 0.16 0.16 0.26 0.24 
F-test 29.55 103.56 119.32 225.64 226.06 99.27 114.35 216.11 217.64 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Notes: This table reports the regression results for corporate governance and the timeliness measures. The sample includes 2,134 Chinese listed firms from 2003 to 2011. See Table 1 for the variable 
definitions. We include three ownership variables to control for the governance characteristics that are not included in the aggregate CG score, but that will influence the information environment. 
These variables are state-owned shares as a proportion of the total number of shares (STATE), non-tradable shares as a proportion of the total number of shares (NONTRADE), and shares held by the 
largest shareholder as a proportion of the total number of shares (TOP1). We also include TRADE, which is defined as the natural logarithm of the value of stocks traded of the year, deflated by the 
natural logarithm of market index at the beginning of the year. All time-varying variables (except CG) are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The estimation method is pooled ordinary least 
squares (OLS) with standard errors clustered by firm. Standardized regression coefficients are reported with t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
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              Table 8. Structural equation modelling of direct and indirect effects of financial integration on the timeliness of price discovery 
Outcome variable (OV) T  TD  TG  TB 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
        
Direct path        
p[FINITI, OV] 0.003  0.006  -0.009*  -0.015*** 
 (0.34)  (1.25)  (-1.74)  (-3.51) 
        
Mediated path        
I.  p[FINITI, CG] 0.392***  0.392***  0.402***  0.402*** 
 (8.41)  (8.41)  (8.63)  (8.63) 
II.        p[CG, OV] -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002** 
 (-0.87)  (-0.71)  (-0.85)  (-2.13) 
Indirect effect (I×II) -0.001  -0.0002  -0.0003  -0.001** 
 (-0.87)  (-0.70)  (-0.85)  (-2.07) 
        
N 12,613  12,613  12,613  12,613 
Goodness of fit (LR test statistic) 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Control variables Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
        
Note: This table presents the results of the path analysis of the relationships among financial integration, the mediating variable, and 
the measures of price timeliness. The sample includes 2,134 Chinese listed firms from 2003 to 2011. We estimate a structural 
equation model (SEM) of the direct effect of financial integration on the timeliness of price discovery as well as the indirect effect 
of financial integration on price timeliness though improved corporate governance. The equations in the SEM include a regression 
of one of the outcome variables, T, TD, TG or TB, on the mediating variable (CG), and a regression of the mediating variable, CG, 
on the source variable, FINITI. We present the unstandardized path coefficients with z-statistics in parentheses. The significance of 
the indirect effect is assessed using the Sobel (1982) test. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively (two-tailed tests). 
 
